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CONSTRUCTION AND SET THEORY
ANDREW POWELL
Abstract. This paper argues that mathematical objects are constructions
and that constructions introduce a flexibility in the ways that mathematical
objects are represented (as sets of binary sequences for example) and presented
(in a particular order for example). The construction approach is then applied
to searching for a mathematical object in a set, and a logarithm-time search
algorithm outlined which applies to a set X of all binary sequences of length
ordinal β with a binary label appended to each sequence to indicate that
sequence is a member of X or not. It follows that deciding membership of
a set for a given binary sequence of length of binary sequence of cardinal
length β takes β + 1 bits, which is shown to be equivalent to the Generalised
Continuum Hypothesis on the assumption that information is minimized when
a mathematical object is created.
1. Philosophical Introduction
This is a short paper about set theory as a foundation for mathematics. It is
not my intention to repeat what many authors have already written on the subject
of set theory, so there is no discussion of the iterative conception of sets, forcing
or limitation of size arguments, and only a mention of large cardinal axioms as a
complexity measure.1 Rather the aim of this paper is to convince the reader about
a certain way of looking at mathematics, which has some implications for set the-
ory. That way of looking at mathematics owes something to information theory
and computer science, and a great deal to P. Lorenzen’s notion of construction (see
[8] and [9]).
The basic idea is that all of the objects and activities of mathematics are constructed
by functions, and that the existence of the functions enables objects (including sets)
to be defined. To give a simple example, the function of successor defines the set
of natural numbers (subject to the condition that there is an initial number, 0,
and the successor function does not output 0) given that the construction defines
the smallest such set because an agent with unbounded but finite resource would
construct exactly the set of the natural numbers.2 Moreover constructions can also
1See [6] for an encyclopedic overview of set theory up to the millennium and [1], [10] for very
readable introductions to the iterative conception of set, which remains the standard motivation
for set theory in terms of motivating the axioms of first-order Zermelo Fraenkel set theory. [4] gives
an excellent background in the development of the concept of set, while [5] gives a structuralist
interpretation of set theory that is still unsurpassed in clarity. Large cardinal axioms (axioms
asserting the existence of infinite cardinal numbers with certain defining properties that are not
theorems of first-order Zermelo Fraenkel set theory) have a vast literature, but [7] is a good
introduction.
2Strictly, in terms of an ontology each mathematical “object” is really a function (or type)
over a set of concrete individuals, because there is an issue of non-unique types, such as in the
statement “1, 2 and 3 are 3 numbers”.
1
CONSTRUCTION AND SET THEORY 2
be carried out on much larger sets than the set of natural numbers, in much the
same way as intuitionists admit for natural numbers and real numbers, namely by
free choice.3 The axiom of choice in the form of the well-order-ability of any well-
founded set is a key principle of infinite construction, and is constructive because
an agent with sufficient (i.e. infinite) resource could choose elements successively
and at infinite limits form the sequence of all elements chosen so far. If one accepts
infinite constructions, then the truth or falsehood of any proposition of first-order
set theory follows. For example, the truth of a quantified proposition has a clear
inductive construction in terms of a sequence of truth values of its subformulas that
follows the constant true sequence or constant false sequence of truth values or that
does not follow those sequences.4 While constructions determine how objects come
to exist, that does not mean that relationships between the objects cannot exist
that were not intended as part of the construction. Mathematics does not need to
be predicative (i.e. defining sets in stages only in terms of sets that are already
defined) provided the rule or process of construction is clear (which in my view
includes the process of choosing members of a set).5 As truth is well defined, the
logic of mathematics does not need to be constructive or intuitionistic. However,
according to this view the objects of mathematics are no more than constructions,
and we should not imagine that they exist independently of the process of their
construction. The objects of mathematics are possibilities of construction, in the
modal-structural sense of [5], and it is the clarity of their rules of construction that
grants them existence.
All constructions create information. It is reasonable to suppose that Ockham’s
Razor applies: when an object is created, the amount of information created with
it is the least possible to be consistent with other objects.
One problem with this approach is the status of these agents with infinite resources
(actually bounded by some infinite ordinal). I do not claim that such agents exist
in our physical world, but I do claim that their existence is possible if a rule of
construction that an agent uses is clear. In the same way that Euclid’s proof of the
infinite of primes gives a bound on finding the next prime in the sequence of prime
natural numbers, and thereby shows that the number of prime natural numbers
is infinite even though there are only finitely many atoms in the universe, rules
of construction that require infinite resources can have interesting properties that
help frame our theories of the physical world.
This may be all very well as a philosophical position (or not of course), but what
practical value does it have? Put briefly, the value of this position is the recognition
that mathematicians have freedom to represent a set of objects as they wish subject
to the constraints of the construction, including the presentation of the set in terms
of ordering. That is to say, if a mathematical object does not come equipped with
3See for example [11].
4For example, (∀x)P (x) is true in a modelM if {a : a ∈M} can be well ordered as {aα : α < ℵ}
using the axiom of choice and the truth values of < P (aα) : α < ℵ > form a constant sequence
of value “true” of length ℵ. The constant sequence of value “false” corresponds to (∀x)¬P (x) and
not following constant sequence of value “false” corresponds to (∃x)P (x).
5This is a deviation from the view of Lorenzen and the school that includes H. Poincaré, H.
Weyl and S. Feferman, see [3] for example.
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its own intrinsic ordering, an ordering can be added without affecting the intrinsic
properties of the mathematical object. It turns out that freedom to present and
represent mathematics does have practical consequences.
2. Search for a Member of a Set
As an example of the constructive nature of mathematics, consider the question
of what it means to search for a member of a set. In theory, if we represent the
members of a set as binary sequences (or bitstrings for short), then you could read
the bitstring and then append a label (say 1) to the bitstring if the bitstring were
a member of the set and another label (say 0) if the bitstring were not a member
of the set.6 In general we would have to rely on an oracle to decide whether a set
defined in this way were (equivalent to) the same set as a defined by a property of
the members, but this lack of decidability is a problem with properties rather than
with sets. We can say that if a set comprises bitstrings that each have length of
least upper bound an ordinal α of cardinal number ℵ, then the amount of informa-
tion in searching for a member of the set is, adding 1 to the length of the sequence
for the binary label, α + 1. In practice, for any reasonably large set we will be
faced with a lot of bitstrings, and have no way to search for a particular bitstring x
other than to enumerate the set of bitstrings somehow. Let us suppose (using our
freedom of construction) that we can linearly order lexicographically (written )7
the members of the set such that there is a least upper bound and greatest lower
bound (in terms of bitstrings of length ℵ) for the set as a whole and we can assign
a distance between any two members of the set. It is reasonable to suppose that a
set can be presented already linearly ordered, not when we are faced with a list to
sort, but when we can choose how to present a set in the first place.
To justify our assumptions, we can define an interval X of binary sequences of
length ordinal β as a set of all such binary β-sequences (binary sequences of length
β) with the properties that every path through the tree of sequences from root
to leaves is a branch of the tree, i.e. (∀f : β → {0, 1})((∀x)(x ∈ f → x ∈∈
X) → (f ∈ X)), where x ∈∈ y is defined as (∃z)(x ∈ z ∧ z ∈ y). Intervals de-
fined in this way are not uniquely determined by ordinal ℵ as the tree could have
gaps between the sequences, but it is possible to make them unique by stipulating
that for interval X , (∀f : β → {0, 1})(f ∈ X). We can also stipulate that the
root represents 0., so that in a sense the interval represents the maximal inter-
val from 0 to 1 comprising binary β-sequences. Intervals of this type are written
([0, 1])(β). To justify that any two members x, y of ([0, 1])(β) can be assigned a
distance d(x, y) to be constant 0 β-sequence with 1 at the position where x and
y first differ (read from 0. onwards). Then d can be seen to be a generalised8
ultrametric (i.e. max(d(x, y), d(y, z)) ≥ d(x, z)).9
6This is possible by fixing an enumeration of a set X, 〈xα : α < ℵ〉 (by the Axiom of Choice),
and for any subset Y ⊆ X forming the binary ℵ-sequence 〈bα : (xα ∈ Y → bα = 1) ∨ (xα /∈
Y → bα = 0)〉, where the ordinal index of any member y ∈ Y is taken from the enumeration of X
(which includes all members of Y ). Thus a subset of X can be identified with a binary ℵ-sequence,
and a set of subsets of X can be identified with a set of binary ℵ-sequences.
7z  y if (∃α < ℵ)[(zα < yα) ∧ (∀β < α)(zβ = yβ) or (∀β < ℵ)(zβ = yβ)
8d is a generalised ultrametric because distances are not real numbers but binary β-sequences.
9To see this, fix labels x, y, z arbitrarily. Then if x splits from y before x splits from z, then
d(x, y) ≥ d(x, z) and d(y, z) = d(x, y), so max(d(x, y), d(y, z)) = d(x, y) ≥ d(x, z). If x splits
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It is possible to losslessly compress any binary β-sequence to a binary i-sequence
where i is a cardinal i ≤ β < i+1. We can thus represent any set of β-sequences
X as ⊆ ([0, 1])(i). But we actually want the construction below to use sets such
that each i-sequence is labelled with a 1 (if x ∈ X) and 0 (if x /∈ X). These
labelled sets of binary i-sequences are then ⊂ ([0, 1])(Ord(i)+1) such that the set
of binary i-sequences without the labels = ([0, 1])(i). We will write the labelled
set of binary i-sequences corresponding to set X as L(X).
Any set X of size ≤ 2ℵ can be searched for the bitstring x of length ℵ in ℵ steps by
representing the set X by the labelled set L(X) and then dividing ([0, 1])(ℵ) into
two equal intervals (which is possible whether the midpoint is ∈ X or not), choos-
ing the interval that contains x based on the value of the next bit of x (because
a  x  b for a, b the lower and upper limits of the interval) and iterating ℵ times
(taking the intersection of intervals at any limit ordinal stages), and checking the
label of x in L(X) at the Ord(ℵ) + 1-th step.
A shorthand way to express the search for the bitstring x is to note that there
are ≤ 2ℵ bitstrings to be searched, but that binary search runs in logarithmic time.
Therefore there are ≃ log2(2
ℵ) = ℵ bits of information in the search for x ∈ X . In
the simplest case of the real numbers, we can see that the search method amounts
to binary search for a binary ω-sequence in a labelled set that extends the closed
interval [0, 1]. That us to say, every binary ω-sequence is represented (starting with
0. in the case of [0, 1]) and every ω-sequence has an extension at position ω + 1
which states whether x ∈ X , where X is coded as a set of binary ω-sequences. It
is clear that x ∈ X , for X a set of real numbers, can be decided in ≤ ω + 1 steps.
But does that mean that the set of real numbers is the closed interval [0, 1]? No,
but it does mean that the set of real numbers are represented by [0, 1] insofar as
purely set theoretic properties, such as cardinality, are concerned.
This enumeration (well-ordering) of intervals can also be regarded as an enumer-
ation of members of the intervals. Members of the intervals may be members of
X but they do not have to be. For definiteness and balance we alternately choose
ℵ-sequences in X and ([0, 1])(ℵ)−X as successive elements of the enumeration as
far as possible (ending when an interval has all members ∈ X or /∈ X), and we see
that there are ≤ (Ord(ℵ) + 1)× Ord(ℵ) + 1 steps to decide x ∈ X . Thus for any
given binary ℵ-sequence x there is an enumeration of X and ([0, 1])(ℵ) − X that
takes < ℵ+ 1 steps to decide x ∈ X . We call this last statement (*).
The statement (*) is not the strongest statement we can make about search-
ing for members of X . It is also true that (+) (∃f : ℵ + 1 × ([0, 1])(ℵ) →
{0, 1})(∀x)(∃α)[(f(α, x) = 1 → x ∈ X) ∧ (f(α, x) = 0 → x /∈ X)], since f(α, x) =
xα, the last member of the labelled sequence x = 〈xβ<α〉 ‖ 〈xα〉 for ℵ < α < ℵ+ 1
trivially satisfies (+). (+) is actually equivalent to (*) by an application of the
from y after x splits from z, then d(x, z) ≥ d(x, y) and d(y, z) = d(x, z), so max(d(x, y), d(y, z)) =
d(x, z) ≥ d(x, z). Finally, if x splits from y at the same position that x splits from z, then d(x, z) =
d(x, y) and d(y, z) ≤ d(x, y), so max(d(x, y), d(y, z)) = d(x, y) ≥ d(x, z). These inequalities are
not strict and allow for the cases of x = y, y = z or z = x.
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axiom of choice.
The amount of information of bits in function f(α) = (λx)f(α, x), for functional
abstraction operator λ, is at least ℵ + 1 because any ℵ-bit binary code for f(α)
would also be a code for some x ∈ ([0, 1])(ℵ). We can express this by means of
a diagonal function d(⌈y⌉) := 1 − ⌈y⌉ (⌈y⌉) for ⌈y⌉ a ℵ-bit code for a function of
ℵ-bits, and note that we get a contradiction if we put d := ⌈y⌉ unless the number
of bits in d is greater than the number of bits in ⌈y⌉. This implies that the number
of bits in f (where f := (λα)f(α)) is at least ℵ+ 1.
We can say (++) that for infinite cardinal ℵ (λx ∈ 2ℵ)(x ∈ X), the concept of
being a member of set X , contains ℵ+1 bits of information, and any x ∈ 2ℵ can be
decided in < ℵ+1 bits. The reason this is true is effectively the diagonal argument
again, because otherwise the ℵ-bit binary code for (λx ∈ 2ℵ)(x ∈ X) would also
be a code for some x ∈ X . (++) is consistent with application and abstraction
operations in the lambda calculus, since application and abstraction apply in this
case to generic ℵ-sequences. In fact if we were to choose to represent a generic
x ∈ 2ℵ by an α-sequence, where ℵ ≤ α < ℵ + 1, we see that ℵ + 1 is a natural
information measure for (λx ∈ 2ℵ)(x ∈ X) as it is the least upper bound of α.
Principle (++) is equivalent to the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) for
ℵ ≥ ℵ0, as it is a choice principle that limits the number of bits in deciding whether
any x ∈ 2ℵ by a function to < ℵ+ 1 bits in any decision process.
Theorem 1. GCH is equivalent to (++) for ℵ ≥ ℵ0.
Proof. Assume GCH. and fix a binary ℵ-sequence x. Then if x ∈ X then by GCH
x will be decided in < |X | ≤ 2ℵ = ℵ+1 bits. While if x /∈ X then x will be decided
in < |([0, 1])(ℵ)−X | = 2ℵ = ℵ+ 1 bits. In either case then x ∈ X can be decided
< ℵ+ 1 steps, i.e. decided in ≤ ℵ steps since ℵ is a cardinal. But if x ∈ X can be
decided in ≤ ℵ steps, then it can be decided in ≤ Ord(ℵ) + 1 steps.
Now assume (++) and that GCH is false, i.e. X has cardinality ℵ < c < 2ℵ,
and fix a binary ℵ-sequence x. Then if x ∈ X , we would always find x in < c bits
by enumeration since there are |([0, 1])(ℵ)−X | = 2ℵ members of ([0, 1])(ℵ) − X
to be enumerated otherwise (and c < 2ℵ). We can now check that c = ℵ + 1 is
consistent with (++), but c > ℵ + 1 leads to x being decided almost always in
≥ ℵ+ 1 bits (contradiction) and ℵ+ 1 > c leads to ℵ+ 1 > c > ℵ (contradiction).
If x /∈ X , then we could either enumerate all c members of X or < 2ℵ members of
([0, 1])(ℵ)−X . But enumerating all of c members of X contradicts (++) because
c = ℵ+1 leads to x being decided in ℵ+1 steps (contradiction), c > ℵ+1 leads to
x being enumerated almost always in > ℵ+ 1 steps (contradiction) and ℵ+ 1 > c
leads to ℵ+ 1 > c > ℵ (contradiction). The remaining possibility if x /∈ X is that
x is enumerated in < 2ℵ bits in ([0, 1])(ℵ) − X . Then ℵ + 1 = 2ℵ is consistent
with (++), and ℵ + 1 < 2ℵ leads to x being decided almost always in ≥ ℵ + 1
steps (contradiction) and ℵ+1 > 2ℵ contradicts Cantor’s theorem that ℵ+1 ≤ 2ℵ
(contradiction). Since X is not empty and 6= ([0, 1])(ℵ) because X has cardinality
c, then both c = ℵ + 1 and ℵ + 1 = 2ℵ are witnessed as x and the associated
enumerations vary; hence c = 2ℵ (contradiction). Hence GCH is true. 
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The reason why a statement like GCH that is independent of first-order Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory turns out to be true for almost all sets10 if (++) is true is that
(++) requires a very rich theory to be true. If we were to measure the complexity
of a decision problem by the size of any set (i.e. possibly “a large cardinal”)11 that
is needed to solve the decision problem by deduction from the axioms of a first-
order theory of sets,12 then (++) indicates that for infinite cardinal ℵ, ℵ rather
than a large cardinal would be the measure of complexity. In Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC), a proof is the construction of set (which in
first-order ZFC corresponds to a formula in the language of ZFC). A set x can be
identified with an enumeration of x by a (one-to-one) function f such that f(α) = x
for some ordinal α, which follows by the well-ordering theorem (requiring the ax-
iom of choice). Thus the cardinality of the set (as the least ordinal) needed to
decide a decision problem is a natural and useful measure of the complexity of the
decision problem. We can conclude that (++) is not compatible with decidability
by a first-order deductive theory (that uses set cardinality as a complexity mea-
sure of decidability), but is compatible with truth in an initial segment of the Von
Neumann hierarchy of pure sets, V . V itself is a class model of first-order set theory.
Labelled sets are a good way to see the power of the decision criterion (++).
Labelled sets clearly represent a standard binary coding of any set, but with the
advantage that it is easy to tell which binary sequences are members of the set
or not. There are uncountably more labelled sets than there can be sets de-
fined in any countable formal language of set theory, because each ⊆ ([0, 1])(ℵ)
has labels for all its members and non-members (which is not true for member-
ship defined by means of formulas through the axiom schemas of separation or
replacement). In fact we can see that all sets ⊆ ([0, 1])(ℵ) can be labelled for
all cardinals ℵ. It is worth noting that labelled sets do not satisfy the axioms
of first-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, because functions cannot be applied to
labels in the same way as to the data that they label; but the axioms could be
easily modified by stripping out the labels (i.e. the Ord(ℵ) + 1-th nodes), ap-
plying the function to binary sequences of length ℵ and adding back the labels.
That is, if L(X) is a labelled set of binary ℵ-sequences then we can form the la-
belled set {〈y, 0〉 : y ∈ ([0, 1])(ℵ)} ⊔ {〈y, 1〉 : 〈x, 1〉 ∈ L(X) → y = f(x)}, where
〈〉 is a Ord(ℵ) + 1-sequence and ⊔ is a union operator with the property that
〈y, 0〉 ⊔ 〈y, 1〉 = 〈y, 1〉. It is clear though that labelled sets preserve what sets can
be formed in initial segments of V .
3. Conclusions
I think the example of search for a member of a set shows, at least in principle,
that taking mathematical objects as constructions (for example, labelled sets) which
can be represented and ordered in different ways has mathematical consequences.
The alternative to the labelled set approach discussed above is to suppose that
10The proof of Theorem 1 uses “almost always” in its arguments. There will be a very small
proportion (ℵ/2ℵ) of sets where the equivalence does not hold.
11If the axiom of choice is assumed, then the size a set is its only distinguishing feature, since
all sets are well-orderable and are isomorphic to ordinals; and ordinals can be losslessly compressed
to cardinals.
12See [2] 417 for an example from the work of H. Friedman of statements that can be encoded
in first-order arithmetic that require a large cardinal axiom.
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there are sets which in principle we cannot define (by means of finite formulas) and
of which we are not even permitted to see their shadows.
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